Author: Fumio Miyata
Affiliation: Independent Researcher, Kanagawa, Japan
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0008-8797-5578
Email: ai.kenkyu.001@gmail.com
Date: August 2026
Abstract
This paper addresses the persistent difficulty of explaining temporal flow within contemporary metaphysics. The four dominant positions—A-theory, B-theory, Presentism, and Eternalism—approach the phenomenon of time from distinct angles, yet none provides the foundational structure required for temporal flow. I argue that this shared limitation arises from a static assumption embedded within all four views. By removing this assumption, three structural conditions for temporal flow—novelty, directedness, and non-return—naturally emerge. On this basis, I propose a new position, the Structural Becoming Theory, as a fifth alternative. This theory does not seek to replace the existing four positions but to supplement and unify them by supplying the foundational structure they lack. The aim of this paper is to clarify the structural conditions that make temporal flow possible and to offer a metaphysically grounded framework capable of resolving the longstanding impasse in the philosophy of time without appealing to scientific or physical assumptions.
Keywords: Temporal Flow; Foundational Structure; Static Assumption; Novelty; Directedness; Non‑return; Becoming; Metaphysical Reconstruction; Structural Becoming Theory; Philosophy of Time
I
Introduction.—The experience of temporal flow remains one of the most challenging phenomena in metaphysics. Despite extensive debate, which spans from classical arguments to the most recent contemporary assessments,\footnote{Cf. Nina Emery, ed., \textit{The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Time} (London: Routledge, 2025); Sam Baron, Kristie Miller, and Jonathan Tallant, \textit{Out of Time: A Philosophical Study of Timelessness} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).} the dominant positions in the philosophy of time—A-theory, B-theory, Presentism, and Eternalism—have not succeeded in explaining how temporal flow is possible.\footnote{J. M. E. McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time,” \textit{Mind} 17, no. 68 (1908): 457–74; Arthur N. Prior, \textit{Past, Present and Future} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); D. H. Mellor, \textit{Real Time II} (London: Routledge, 1998).} These views tend to treat time as a pre-given structure, relegating flow to a secondary or derivative status.
This paper argues that the impasse arises from a shared assumption underlying all four positions: the assumption that time is static. By identifying and removing this assumption, we can reconstruct the foundational structure required for temporal flow. I call the resulting position the Structural Becoming Theory, which I present as a fifth alternative that supplements and unifies the existing four.
The contributions of this paper are threefold:
- To clarify the structural weakness shared by the four dominant theories.
- To articulate the foundational structure necessary for temporal flow.
- To introduce a new theory—Structural Becoming Theory—that provides this structure.
II
The Four Dominant Positions.—The four major positions in contemporary metaphysics can be summarized as follows:
- A-theory: Temporal flow is real, but its foundational structure is unspecified. It asserts that past, present, and future are objective tensed properties.\footnote{McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time”; Ned Markosian, “How Fast Does Time Pass?” \textit{Philosophy and Phenomenological Research} 53, no. 4 (1993): 829–44.}
- B-theory: Temporal flow is denied; time is treated as a static ordering of events via tenseless relations like “earlier than” and “later than.”\footnote{Donald C. Williams, “The Myth of Passage,” \textit{The Journal of Philosophy} 48, no. 15 (1951): 457–72; Mellor, \textit{Real Time II}; Yuval Dolev, “The Tenseless Theory of Time: Insights and Limitations,” \textit{The Review of Metaphysics} 54, no. 2 (2000): 259–88.}
- Presentism: Only the present exists. While it aligns with our intuitive sense of flow, it fails to provide a robust structural account of how the present dynamically moves.\footnote{Prior, \textit{Past, Present and Future}; John Bigelow, “Presentism and Properties,” \textit{Philosophical Perspectives} 10 (1996): 35–52; Ned Markosian, “A Defense of Presentism,” \textit{Oxford Studies in Metaphysics} 1 (2004): 47–82; Michael B. Burke, “Liberated Presentism,” \textit{The Review of Metaphysics} 73, no. 3 (2020): 569–603; Sam Baron, Kristie Miller, and Jonathan Tallant, \textit{Out of Time: A Philosophical Study of Timelessness} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).}
- Eternalism: All past, present, and future times exist equally in a four-dimensional block universe, leaving no room for objective temporal flow.\footnote{Theodore Sider, \textit{Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001); Matias Slavov, “Time as an Empirical Concept in Special Relativity,” \textit{The Review of Metaphysics} 73, no. 2 (2019): 335–53.}
These positions differ significantly, yet they converge in their inability to explain temporal flow.
III
The Shared Weakness.—Despite their differences, the four positions share a structural weakness: none provides the foundational conditions required for temporal flow. These conditions can be articulated as three metaphysical elements:\footnote{Cf. C. D. Broad, \textit{Scientific Thought: A Philosophical Analysis of Some of Its Fundamental Concepts} (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner \& Co., 1923).}
(1) Novelty
Temporal flow requires the emergence of new states.
Static frameworks cannot accommodate novelty because all states are treated as already given.
(2) Directedness
Temporal flow requires an orientation toward the future and fixation of the past.
Static frameworks treat past and future as structurally equivalent.
(3) Non-return
Temporal flow requires that past states do not reoccur.
Static frameworks assume that states are, in principle, recoverable.
These three elements constitute the foundational structure of temporal flow.
The absence of this structure explains why the four dominant theories cannot account for flow.
IV
Removing the Static Assumption.—The shared weakness of the four theories arises from a static assumption:
- Time is homogeneous and unchanging.
- Temporal order is fixed in advance.
- Past, present, and future are structurally equivalent.
- States are, in principle, recoverable.
This assumption precludes temporal flow at the structural level.
What emerges when the static assumption is removed?
Once the static assumption is removed, the following structural features naturally appear:
- States are not pre-given but generated.
- Order is not fixed but formed.
- The past becomes fixed as the result of generation.
- The future becomes open as the domain of possible generation.
These features correspond precisely to the three foundational elements of temporal flow: novelty, directedness, and non-return.
Thus, removing the static assumption allows us to reconstruct the foundational structure of temporal flow.
V
The Fifth Theory.—This theory is metaphysically modest. The Structural Becoming Theory is proposed as a fifth alternative that supplies the foundational structure missing from the four dominant positions. It draws historic inspiration from process metaphysics,\footnote{Alfred North Whitehead, \textit{Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology} (New York: Macmillan, 1929).} which prioritizes becoming over static being, yet focuses specifically on reconstructing the minimal structural constraints of temporal passage.
Core Claims of Structural Becoming Theory
- Time should not be understood as a pre-given structure but as the generation of foundational structure.
- Novelty, directedness, and non-return are the minimal structural conditions required for temporal flow.
- These conditions arise naturally once the static assumption is removed.
- The theory does not replace the four dominant positions but supplements them by providing the structural basis they lack.
Relation to the Four Dominant Positions
Structural Becoming Theory is not a rival to the existing four theories.
Rather, it strengthens them:
- It provides A-theory with the structural basis it lacks.\footnote{Cf. J. M. E. McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time,” \textit{Mind} 17, no. 68 (1908): 457–74; Bradford Skow, \textit{Objective Becoming} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).}
- It incorporates B-theory’s static ordering as a special case within a broader generative framework, validating its relational structure while reintroducing dynamic passage.\footnote{Cf. Donald C. Williams, “The Myth of Passage,” \textit{The Journal of Philosophy} 48, no. 15 (1951): 457–72; Yuval Dolev, “The Tenseless Theory of Time: Insights and Limitations,” \textit{The Review of Metaphysics} 54, no. 2 (2000): 259–88.}
- It reinterprets Presentism’s privileged present as a structural feature of generation, avoiding standard truthmaker objections.\footnote{Cf. John Bigelow, “Presentism and Properties,” \textit{Philosophical Perspectives} 10 (1996): 35–52; Ned Markosian, “A Defense of Presentism,” \textit{Oxford Studies in Metaphysics} 1 (2004): 47–82; Michael B. Burke, “Liberated Presentism,” \textit{The Review of Metaphysics} 73, no. 3 (2020): 569–603.}
- It allows Eternalism’s equal existence of times to be understood within a generative order, offering a dynamic foundation for the block universe.\footnote{Cf. Theodore Sider, \textit{Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001); Matias Slavov, “Time as an Empirical Concept in Special Relativity,” \textit{The Review of Metaphysics} 73, no. 2 (2019): 335–53.}
Thus, the fifth theory unifies and supplements the existing four.
VI
Conclusion.—This paper has argued that the longstanding impasse in the philosophy of time arises from a static assumption shared by the four dominant theories. By removing this assumption, we can reconstruct the foundational structure required for temporal flow—novelty, directedness, and non-return.
The Structural Becoming Theory provides this structure.
It does not seek to overthrow the existing four theories but to supplement and unify them by supplying the foundational conditions they lack.
This framework is compatible with classical metaphysical commitments. This fifth theory offers a new metaphysical framework capable of resolving the persistent difficulty of explaining temporal flow.