The Dynamic Formation of Social Structures: Coordination, Stabilization, and Irreversible Reorganization

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Author: Fumio Miyata
Affiliation: Independent Researcher, Kanagawa, Japan
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0008-8797-5578
Email: ai.kenkyu.001@gmail.com
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21926792
Date: August 2026

Abstract

Classical social ontology has predominantly focused on the constitutive conditions of institutional facts and collective intentionality. While these accounts successfully explain how social structures exist, they remain largely static and offer limited resources for understanding how such structures emerge, persist, and transform over historical time. This paper develops a dynamic framework centered on three interrelated processes: coordination, stabilization, and irreversible reorganization.

Coordination generates shared patterns of action and expectation. Stabilization consolidates these patterns into durable structures through historical accumulation, sedimentation, and structural asymmetry. Reorganization occurs when stabilized structures become dysfunctional, leading to dissolution and the formation of new configurations. Crucially, this cycle is irreversible: once a structure has dissolved and reorganized, the system cannot return to its prior state.

We contrast this account with state-symmetric equilibrium models (such as rules-in-equilibrium), engage directly with the “processual turn” in social ontology, and defend the irreversibility claim against objections based on institutional restoration. The framework provides a unified processual account of the emergence, persistence, and transformation of social roles, institutions, and categories, offering a robust theoretical foundation for dynamic social ontology.

Keywords: social ontology; coordination; stabilization; irreversibility; structural reorganization; collective practices; social categories; processual ontology; institutional dynamics; path dependency

1. Introduction

Social ontology has traditionally investigated the conditions under which social entities—institutions, roles, norms, and categories—exist. The dominant approaches, associated with Searle (2010), Gilbert (2014), and Tuomela (2013), emphasize constitutive rules, joint commitment, and collective intentionality. These accounts have been highly successful in explaining the metaphysical status of institutional facts. However, they remain largely static. They tell us how social structures are constituted once they are in place, but they say comparatively little about how such structures come into being, how they acquire durability, and how they eventually break down or transform.

Recent work has begun to address this limitation. Hindriks and Guala (2015) model institutions as rules-in-equilibrium and thereby introduce a more dynamic perspective. Phenomenological approaches have long stressed the historicity and relational character of social existence (Schutz 1967; Zahavi 1999). Critiques of static social categories (Haslanger 2012; Hacking 1999; Khalidi 2013) further highlight the need for accounts that can accommodate transformation.

Building on these developments, this paper proposes a processual model of social structure formation organized around three moments:

  1. Coordination — the generative process through which shared patterns of action and expectation first arise;
  2. Stabilization — the consolidation of these patterns into durable, asymmetric structures;
  3. Irreversible reorganization — the transformation of structures that have become dysfunctional or historically outdated.

Theoretical Contribution & Relation to the Processual Turn.
The primary contribution of this paper is not merely to restate the need for a dynamic social ontology, but to specify the precise mechanism that existing processual accounts leave underdetermined. Recent calls for a “processual turn” (Renault 2016) correctly reject substantial and purely relational ontologies, yet they typically stop short of explaining how fluid interactions acquire temporary durability and why structural change exhibits directional irreversibility rather than reversible oscillation.

This paper fills that gap by identifying three analytically distinct operations—coordination, stabilization, and reorganization—and by demonstrating that the transition from the second to the third operation is governed by hysteresis. In contrast to equilibrium models that treat institutional change as movement across a fixed state space (Hindriks & Guala 2015), the present account shows that structural reorganization alters the state space itself. The result is a form of path dependence that cannot be reduced to payoff shifts or re-coordination within an unchanging possibility set.

2. The Limits of Static Social Ontology

Searle’s theory of institutional facts remains the most influential constitutive account. On this view, institutional reality is created through the collective acceptance of constitutive rules of the form “X counts as Y in C.” While powerful, the account is largely silent on the processes through which such acceptance emerges, stabilizes, or erodes (Searle 2010).

Gilbert’s plural subject theory explains joint commitment and the corresponding obligations, yet it does not systematically model how plural subjects form, persist, or dissolve over time (Gilbert 2014). Schmid’s work on the we-mode similarly prioritizes collective subjectivity over structural dynamics (Schmid 2009).

Three limitations follow:

  1. Generative deficit. Existing theories explain how structures exist once constituted, but not how they emerge from ongoing interaction.
  2. Static conception of stability. Stability is treated as a given condition rather than as an achievement that must be continually maintained through repeated coordination.
  3. Absence of a theory of transformation. There is little systematic account of how institutions lose coherence, dissolve, and reorganize into new forms.

Hindriks and Guala (2015) partially address these issues by unifying rule-based and equilibrium-based conceptions of institutions. Their “rules-in-equilibrium” framework allows for shifts between equilibria. The present paper builds on this insight but goes further by emphasizing the historical asymmetry and irreversibility of structural change. Equilibrium shifts can, in principle, be reversible; the reorganization of social structures, I argue, is not.

3. Coordination: The Emergence of Shared Patterns

Social structures begin with coordination. When individuals align their actions, expectations, and interpretations, they generate shared patterns that function as proto-structures.

Coordination involves at least four elements:

  • mutual reference of actions;
  • the formation of shared expectations;
  • the accumulation of interactional history;
  • the emergence of “stabilized otherness,” in which the actions of others come to constrain and shape one’s own possibilities.

These processes are not reducible to explicit agreement. As Bratman (2014) has shown in the context of shared agency, coordination can arise from interlocking intentions and meshing sub-plans. Phenomenological accounts of participatory sense-making further emphasize that meaning is generated in the interaction itself rather than merely in individual minds (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007). Empirical work in cultural sociology confirms that shared practices produce emergent structures of meaning (Cerulo 2018).

The crucial point is that coordination already introduces a minimal form of historicity: past interactions begin to shape present possibilities. This historicity becomes decisive in the next stage.

4. Stabilization: Historicity, Asymmetry, and Role Fixation

Repeated coordination leads to stabilization. Patterns that were initially fluid become sedimented. Schutz’s analysis of the sedimentation of social meaning provides a useful phenomenological background (Schutz 1967). Berger and Luckmann’s account of institutionalization similarly stresses the progressive objectivation of shared practices (Berger & Luckmann 1966).

Stabilization is characterized by three features:

  1. Historicity. Past interactions constrain the range of present possibilities.
  2. Asymmetry. Once a structure has stabilized, it cannot simply be reversed by a decision to “go back.” The costs of undoing accumulated expectations, roles, and material arrangements are typically high.
  3. Role fixation. Participants’ positions become embedded in the structure; individuals come to occupy relatively durable social locations.

Stabilized structures appear as institutions, norms, and roles. Their durability is not the product of a single constitutive act but of the irreversible accumulation of coordinated practices. Epstein’s reconstruction of social foundations usefully highlights the multiple layers (anchors, framing principles, etc.) that sustain such durability (Epstein 2015).

5. Reorganization: Dissolution and Irreversible Transformation

No social structure persists indefinitely. When stabilized patterns become dysfunctional—misaligned with current practices, material conditions, or normative expectations—they enter a process of reorganization.

I model this process as a three-phase cycle:

  1. Construction. New patterns of coordination begin to emerge, often at the margins of existing structures.
  2. Dissolution. The existing structure loses coherence. Expectations cease to mesh; roles become contested or empty; the functional relevance of the structure declines. This phase parallels Haslanger’s critique of the rigidity of socially constructed categories (Haslanger 2012).
  3. Reintegration. New patterns consolidate into a reorganized structure. Khalidi’s work on dynamic classification in the social sciences provides a useful parallel: categories are not fixed natural kinds but evolve with practices and interests (Khalidi 2013).

5.1 The Logic of Structural Irreversibility

The central theoretical claim is that structural reorganization is irreversible in a stronger sense than equilibrium shift. To make the distinction precise, consider two types of institutional change:

  • Type-E change (equilibrium shift): Agents move from one equilibrium to another within a fixed strategy space. If the relevant parameters (payoffs, signals, or common knowledge) revert, the original equilibrium remains accessible. Change is state-symmetric and, in principle, time-reversible (Lewis 1969; Hindriks & Guala 2015).

  • Type-S change (structural reorganization): Stabilization has already embedded the structure in sedimentation, material infrastructure, cognitive habits, and institutional anchors (Epstein 2015; Schutz 1967). Dissolution does not merely alter payoffs; it dismantles the background conditions that made the original equilibrium intelligible and actionable. Reintegration therefore occurs in a transformed possibility space. The path out of the prior structure is not the inverse of the path into it. This is hysteresis at the ontological level: the system cannot return to the prior state because that state no longer exists as a coherent option within the new configuration of practices and expectations.

The difference is not empirical but ontological. Type-E change preserves the underlying space of social possibilities; Type-S change reconstitutes it.

5.2 Defense Against the Objection from Institutional Restoration

A natural objection is that societies frequently appear to restore earlier institutions or roles after periods of disruption. Does such restoration not demonstrate reversibility?

The objection confuses nominal continuity with ontological identity. When a society attempts to “restore” a prior structure, the restored form is not the original structure recovered, but a secondary construction under altered historical conditions. The new structure inherits the memory of the intervening crisis, the defensive or ideological motivations that prompted restoration, and a set of background practices that have already been transformed. Consequently, even when the constitutive rule retains the same surface form (“X counts as Y in C”), the anchors, the tacit competencies, and the relational expectations that sustain it have changed. What looks like reversal is in fact a further stage of irreversible reorganization.

6. Case Study: The Evolution of Social Categories and Professional Roles

To demonstrate how the three-stage model operates in concrete social reality, consider the historical transformation of the professional role of the office worker over recent decades.

6.1 Phase 1: Proto-Coordination

Historically, the traditional “office worker” role was defined by strict spatial co-presence, physical handling of paper artifacts, and synchronous face-to-face supervision. With the emergence of digital network tools, informal micro-coordination practices began emerging at the margins of traditional office structures. Workers and managers began aligning expectations around asynchronous messaging, remote file sharing, and project-based outputs rather than physical desk presence. These informal micro-alignments functioned as proto-structures of a new work paradigm.

6.2 Phase 2: Stabilization and Sedimentation

As these coordinated digital practices repeated, they underwent stabilization. Institutional anchors (cloud infrastructure, digital surveillance tools, remote employment contracts) sedimented these practices into formalized hybrid roles. Role fixation shifted: “professional dedication” was no longer evaluated primarily by physical presence at a designated desk between 9:00 AM and 5:00 PM, but by digital responsiveness and deliverable execution. Past interactions constrained current possibilities, establishing new normative baselines for organizational life.

6.3 Phase 3: Dissolution and Irreversible Reorganization

When external shocks (such as the global shift to remote and hybrid work in the early 2020s) accelerated this trend, the classical model of the office worker suffered structural dissolution. Unilateral expectations of mandatory 5-day physical co-presence lost both functional efficacy and normative legitimacy.

When organizations subsequently attempt “Return to Office” (RTO) mandates, they do not—and cannot—restore the unreflective pre-digital office culture of the 1990s. Instead, RTO mandates encounter widespread renegotiation, employee turnover, and hybrid compromise. The role of the office worker has been irreversibly reorganized: even when workers sit at physical desks today, their work practices remain saturated with digital mediation, asynchronous communication protocols, and altered expectations of spatial autonomy.

As Takakusa (2025) demonstrates in his phenomenological analysis of mediated sociality, digital environments alter the very structure of thou- and they-orientations, transforming how social actors experience presence and mutual awareness. Empirical studies of meaning reconstruction confirm that categories of work and identity are continually renegotiated through ongoing practice (Cerulo 2018).

6.4 Generalizability

The office-worker case is not an isolated illustration but an instance of a general mechanism. The same three-phase sequence—proto-coordination, sedimentation with role fixation, and irreversible reorganization—can be identified across different kinds of social entities:

  • Professional and epistemic roles (e.g., the ongoing reorganization of academic authorship and peer review under AI-mediated practices).
  • Legal-institutional categories (citizenship, corporate personhood, property), which, once adapted to new socioeconomic conditions, cannot be restored to their prior anchoring without reinterpretation.
  • Social identity kinds (Haslanger 2012; Hacking 1999), which undergo dissolution when sedimented norms lose functional or normative coherence and reintegrate into new configurations.

In each case, the social kind in question is revealed to be path-dependent: its identity conditions at t₂ are not recoverable from those at t₁ once reorganization has occurred.

7. Conclusion

This paper has proposed a dynamic framework for social ontology organized around coordination, stabilization, and irreversible reorganization. The model reframes social structures as processes rather than static entities and offers a unified explanation of their emergence, persistence, and transformation.

The account complements existing theories of collective intentionality (Tuomela 2013; Gilbert 2014) by supplying the missing temporal and historical dimension. It extends equilibrium-based approaches (Hindriks & Guala 2015) by demonstrating that structural reorganization alters the possibility space itself, rendering transformation historically irreversible. By connecting processual social ontology (Renault 2016) with phenomenological analyses of sedimented meaning (Schutz 1967; Zahavi 1999; Takakusa 2025) and contemporary work on dynamic classification (Khalidi 2013; Haslanger 2012), the framework demonstrates how dynamic social kinds evolve without collapsing into mere indeterminacy.

By foregrounding historical asymmetry and structural cycles, the framework provides a more adequate foundation for understanding the dynamics of social existence. Future work should examine the micro-mechanisms of coordination more closely and explore the implications of irreversibility for theories of social change and institutional design.

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